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Engaging the World of the Supernatural: 
Anthropology, Phenomenology and the Limitations of Scientific Rationalism 
in the Study of the Supernatural 
 





Scientific rationalism has long been considered one of the pillars of true science. It has been one 
of the criteria academics have used in their efforts to categorise disciplines as scientific. Perhaps 
scientific rationalism acquired this privileged status because it worked relatively well within the 
context of the natural sciences, where it seemed to be easy to apply this kind of rationalism to the 
solution of natural scientific problems. However, with the split in the scientific world between the 
natural sciences and the social sciences, the role of scientific rationalism, especially in the social 
sciences, becomes less clear-cut, with the ambiguous status of positivism in the social sciences 
making scientific rationalism more of a shaky foundation than a pillar of social science. The 
weaknesses inherent in scientific rationalism are most exposed within the context of anthropology, 
and particularly in the anthropological study of the supernatural, or supernatural beliefs. This 
paper will attempt to point out some of the weaknesses of scientific rationalism specifically within 
the context of the anthropology of the supernatural and religion. By doing so, it is hoped to show, 
with reference to some phenomenological ideas, that, while scientific rationalism does have its 
merits within anthropology, a rigid application of rationalism could become a limitation for 
anthropological studies of those aspects of human life that challenge Western scientific 
rationalism. The debate around the position of anthropology as a science or non-science is related 
to the issue of the role of scientific rationalism. This debate is indeed part of the history of 
anthropology and is as yet unresolved. As such, the ideas of several earlier scholars will be 






The belief in the supernatural is perhaps as old as 
humanity itself. Humans have always been both 
fascinated by and, at the same time, overcome with an 
inexplicable sense of awe when listening to or telling 
stories of the supernatural. It is one of those aspects of 
humanity that links one human society with another, 
regardless of how diverse they may appear to be on 
the surface. The supernatural and belief in it can thus 
be considered to be a cultural universal, since it has 
featured prominently in human cultures throughout 
the ages.  
 
However, with the dawning of the Enlightenment in 
Europe, which was marked by the rise of the rational 
mind and science, the supernatural was relegated to 
the realm of superstition and irrationality, and thus 
had no place within the emerging culture of science 
and the rational explanation of phenomena. During 
this period, therefore, “the way was gradually paved 
for the triumph of observation and reason” (Coleman, 
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Butcher & Carson, 1980, p. 39). In fact, it could be 
argued that the Enlightenment represented a period 
when humans went to extraordinary lengths to 
demonstrate the superior status of reason over 
supernatural beliefs. As a result, mentioning one’s 
belief in the supernatural within the scientific world 
today would more than likely encourage raised eye-
brows and stares of disbelief, if not total ridicule. The 
question is: why this response by representatives of 
the rational? 
 
One hypothesis that could be put forward is that the 
rational mind, as illustrated seemingly by the mind of 
the pure scientist, has come to be regarded as the 
epitome of the all-knowing mind. Thus, the Western 
conception of science and rationalism has been 
imposed upon the rest of the world as being the 
unequivocal “messiah” of what science is supposed to 
be. The way in which science is defined and practised 
is a monopoly held by the West, and therefore what 
constitutes valid scientific knowledge is only that 
which conforms to the Western definition of science. 
Indeed, social science has been defined by proponents 
of Western positivism in terms of a characteristic that 
must be present for any social scientific approach to 
the study of phenomena to be regarded as scientific, 
this criterion being that the social sciences “should 
emulate the methodology or logic of the natural 
sciences” (Babbie & Mouton, 2001, p. 21). Through 
this approach, the social sciences can strive towards 
the goals of objectivity, the pursuit for scientific truth 
and rationality. Any approaches that do not conform 
to these requirements are simply not regarded as 
science.  And this is where the problem begins. 
 
The Problem Defined 
 
The position of anthropology within the realm of 
science has been one characterised by ambiguity, a 
trait that seems to be the case for the social sciences 
in general. Anthropology, like the other social 
sciences, has had a history of struggle, battling to 
have itself recognised as a valid science. This 
struggle, as the philosopher of science Dilthey (1988) 
argued, stemmed from the position of anthropology in 
between the two major traditions of scientific 
explanation, namely Naturwissenschaften (natural 
science), which was influenced by positivism, and 
Geisteswissenschaften (human science), influenced, 
among other things, by phenomenology. The problem 
for anthropology has been to contend with the 
demands of both, sharply contrasting, approaches, 
distinguished as follows by Babbie and Mouton 
(2001): “positivism emphasizes the object of the 
natural and social sciences, the phenomenological 
tradition emphasizes the differences between them” 
(p. 28). Explanation, rigid methodologies, complex 
theories and hypotheses, all considered to be 
distinguishing features that separate the scientific and 
rational from the unscientific and irrational, have 
created more problems for anthropology than 
solutions. These problems have emerged due to a 
peculiar “merging” in anthropology of two distinct 
knowledge contexts, or what Babbie and Mouton call 
“worlds of knowledge”, maintaining that knowledge 
can be divided into “the world of everyday life and 
lay knowledge and the world of science” (2001, p. 6). 
Knowledge that could form part of the realm of the 
supernatural falls within the category of lay or 
everyday knowledge, which Babbie and Mouton 
describe as the kind of knowledge that people 
“basically accept … on face value” (2001, p. 7). 
Religious or supernatural knowledge could fall into 
this category, because people in societies that attach a 
great degree of significance to the supernatural rarely 
question such knowledge, and instead tend to accept 
this knowledge on face value. This is why it is not 
irrational to attribute illness or misfortune to 
witchcraft or sorcery in societies where knowledge of 
witchcraft and sorcery are accepted as normal (Osei, 
2003). However, within the world of science, the 
uncritical acceptance of knowledge is unacceptable. 
Knowledge can only be accepted as “true” once it has 
been successfully subjected to “systematic and 
rigorous enquiry” (Babbie & Mouton, 2001, p. 7). 
The idea of multiple worlds can be traced to the work 
of the phenomenologist Alfred Schutz, who coined 
the term “multiple realities” (Babbie & Mouton, 
2001, p. 28). This view relates to James’s concept of 
“sub-universes” which are characterised by the 
existence of numerous “worlds” of interaction, such 
as “the world of science, the world of ideal relations, 
the various supernatural worlds of mythology and 
religion, etc.” (Babbie & Mouton, 2001, p. 28).   
 
There is thus an incompatibility between these two 
worlds, that of lay knowledge and that of science. 
Anthropology seems to be trapped between these two 
worlds, since anthropologists are expected to 
investigate aspects related to the world of everyday 
life and lay knowledge within the confines of the 
world of science. The question is whether or not this 
is possible. The answer to this question lies partly in 
recognising the undertones in anthropology of a 
movement that, in my view, provides perhaps a way 
out of this trap. This movement has become known as 
phenomenology. 
 
A Brief Outline of Phenomenology and its Relation 
to and Significance for Anthropology 
 
“Phenomenology” has become the term used to refer 
to 
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a philosophical movement whose primary 
objective is the direct investigation and 
description of phenomena as consciously 
experienced, without theories about their 
causal explanation and as free as possible 
from unexamined preconceptions and 
presuppositions.  (Spiegelberg, 1975, p. 3) 
 
According to Hammond, Howarth and Keat (1991), 
phenomenology can briefly be defined as “the 
description of things as one experiences them” (p. 1). 
The common idea that links these two definitions is 
the notion of the description of the direct experience 
of phenomena, with the focus on what Taylor calls 
“pre-theoretical understanding” (quoted in Babbie & 
Mouton, 2001, p. 28). Already implicit in this by no 
means exhaustive definition of phenomenology is the 
idea of direct observation, which has become one of 
the cornerstones of anthropological investigation. In 
anthropology, the technique of participant-
observation, which is aimed at “making accurate 
descriptions of the … daily activities of the people in 
a society”, involves “direct observations of human 
social interaction and behaviour” through open 
participation by the researcher in the everyday 
routines of the cultural group (Scupin & DeCorse, 
2004, p. 322). From a phenomenological perspective, 
thus, anthropology should involve a “descriptive 
study of man’s consciousness of himself as man” 
(Spiegelberg, 1975, p. 268). 
 
In the light of the above, phenomenology is pointed to 
as having specific significance for anthropology as a 
discipline. Anthropology can be very broadly defined 
as “the systematic [and holistic] study of humankind 
… both past and present” (Scupin & DeCorse, 2004, 
p. 2). The object of anthropology is thus the human 
being, and it attempts to understand the human 
being’s consciousness of himself and also how he 
appears to himself. In the anthropological sense, the 
human being is “essentially a phenomenological 
being. He and his behaviour cannot be understood 
without knowing how he appears to himself. There is 
therefore every reason to take this phenomenal aspect 
of man seriously” (Spiegelberg, 1975, p. 270). 
Phenomenological ideas thus underpin the core focus 
of anthropology and these ideas will become apparent 
throughout the paper. 
 
Anthropology, the Supernatural and the Study of 
Religion     
 
Of particular relevance to this paper is the 
anthropological approach to the study of religion - 
and, more specifically, the question of whether or not 
anthropology can be useful in investigating claims of 
supernatural phenomena. One of the characteristic 
features of anthropology has been defined as holism, 
that is, the pursuit of trying to understand a particular 
phenomenon within as broad and comprehensive a 
perspective as possible, as well as within the context 
within which the phenomenon occurs. Howard (1986) 
sees the anthropological pursuit of holism as an 
attempt to “study all phenomena in relation to an 
encompassing whole [as well as] … all the parts to 
further our knowledge of the nature of the totality” (p. 
12). If one looks at the anthropological study of 
religion, then, from a holistic perspective, it can be 
argued that religion and religious beliefs cannot be 
understood as a totality or encompassing whole if 
they are not looked at within the context of the 
supernatural, which forms an integral part of that 
totality. There is almost invariably a link made 
between religious belief and the supernatural, a link 
that appears to be made cross-culturally. As Harris 
(1993, p. 386) suggests, religion can be associated 
with the realm of supernatural forces. That is, in 
effect what one aspect of religion is, namely an 
organised system of thought or belief, whereby 
people attempt to explain the inexplicable in terms of 
supernatural phenomena. Therefore, when studying 
religion, the supernatural aspect of religion cannot 
simply be ignored. 
 
Sometimes a Western-trained anthropologist may 
tend to overlook the supernatural aspect of religion as 
a result of having adopted a Western-oriented idea of 
rationalism. This is why, in anthropology, an 
emphasis on cultural relativism is another 
characteristic feature of the discipline. Relativism 
relates to rationalism in the sense that, in trying to 
understand the beliefs and practices of a specific 
society, the rationalism behind those beliefs and 
practices can perhaps only be understood if they are 
looked at within the specific cultural context within 
which they occur. Concerning relativism specifically, 
the issue at stake is: how possible is it to possess an 
attitude of total relativism? Given the obvious 
problem of the tension between the anthropologist’s 
role as a participant in the society s/he is studying and 
the role of observer, many anthropologists may feel 
that relativism is more of an ideal that should be 
aspired to rather than a practically viable attitude. 
However, Howard (1986) presents a neat way out of 
this problem in his definition of cultural relativism:  
 
Cultural relativism does not mean that 
anything a particular people does or thinks 
must be approved or accepted without 
criticism. Rather, it means we should 
evaluate cultural patterns within the 
context of their occurrence.  (p. 14) 
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This idea should apply to anthropological studies of 
religion and the supernatural. When confronted with 
the supernatural beliefs of other societies, instead of 
trying to understand them from a Western rational 
perspective, we should look at those beliefs within the 
context of their occurrence, that is, as a part of the 
direct experience of a society. To echo Howard’s 
point, this does not imply that we should look at those 
beliefs and associated practices uncritically.    
 
One of the outstanding features of religion is the 
acceptance of the existence of certain supernatural 
forces without requiring ‘scientific’ proof of their 
existence. In other words, these beliefs are based on 
the faith of the individuals who believe them, whether 
they believe in deities or demons. Within this context, 
the problem for the anthropological study of religion 
and the supernatural becomes clear: how can a 
discipline striving for rational and scientific 
recognition attempt to study phenomena that may be 
construed as falling within the realm of the irrational 
and unscientific? This highlights the fundamental 
contradiction between science, as defined in Western 
terms, and religion: science relies on hard evidence 
achieved in a particular methodological way; religion, 
and the supernatural, rely on faith. Jarvie and Agassi 
(1970) view the difference between science and 
religion as based upon the difference between myths 
and theories: 
 
Primitive people … believed in myths of 
an historical character, while rational 
people believed in scientific theories of a 
universal character. What differentiates the 
mythical from the scientific is … that 
myths are stories, they explain by 
appealing to creations and origins, whereas 
scientific theories explain by appeal to 
universal laws.  (quoted in Wilson, 1970, 
p. 175) 
 
Thus, can one argue that, because the supernatural 
does not conform to Western concepts of rationalism 
and the scientific method, it cannot be studied - and, 
therefore, that it does not exist?  Furthermore, can it 
be argued that those cultures that attach a greater 
degree of significance to supernatural explanations of 
the world around them are any less rational than those 
in the West?   
 
Anthropology: Science or not? 
 
The ambiguous position of anthropology within the 
social and natural science/humanities debate has 
highlighted the problem of rationalism with regard to 
the anthropological study of phenomena. The 
question of whether anthropology is closer to the 
humanities than to the natural and social sciences has 
been one of the major debates within the discipline. 
Keesing and Strathern (1998) recognise this: 
“Including anthropology within the social sciences 
raises questions about whether anthropologists are 
entitled to wear the sacred mantle of ‘science’” (p. 6). 
The historical development of the discipline has 
invariably included many attempts to create an 
anthropology that was, in character, like those 
disciplines of the hard or pure sciences, as seen for 
example in the kind of anthropology that the classical 
functionalists, as typically exemplified by Durkheim, 
Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown, tried to create. 
Each of these classical founding fathers of modern 
anthropology in one way or another attempted to 
interpret and explain human phenomena in terms of 
the natural, assuming that humans could, in fact, be 
studied with the same kind of rigid objectivity and 
scientific rationalism that characterised the 
methodology of the hard or natural sciences: 
 
... functionalists were thoroughly 
committed to a natural science model of 
society. Social life was deemed to be 
empirical, orderly and patterned, and 
therefore also amenable to rigorous, 
positivistic, scientific study. (Barrett, 
1998, p. 60) 
 
These attempts were part of the struggle of these early 
social scientists to prove to their natural science 
contemporaries that the social sciences could be 
regarded as ‘real’ sciences in terms of the created 
traits of positivism, objectivity and rationalism that 
had been postulated as being the distinguishing 
features of a true science. This point emphasises the 
ambiguous position of anthropology in the sense that, 
if its goal is to be a descriptive study of man, as 
outlined previously, how can it also have as its goal 
the rational explanation of man? 
 
Since anthropology has the study of humans as its 
subject matter, can it be an objective, rationalist 
discipline? Merleau-Ponty rejected an objectivist 
view of the world and dismissed it as a 
misrepresentation of the world that one actually 
experiences by branding it as “prejudiced description” 
(Hammond et al., 1991, p. 133). Merleau-Ponty’s 
problem with the objectivist view was based on its 
claim that fixed boundaries could be drawn around 
every object, that is that “every object is fully 
determinate …[having]… fixed or precise limits or 
boundaries … and is thus distinct from everything 
else” (Hammond et al., 1991, p. 133). One 
implication of this claim is that any object that cannot 
be objectively located within fixed boundaries is 
either impossible or does not exist. For Merleau-
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Ponty, this view was unacceptable because “non-
determinacy is primarily a characteristic of what is 
actually experienced in the world” (Hammond et al., 
1991, p. 135). For the objective scientist, phenomena 
that fall outside the limits of rational and objective 
sensory perception are thus dismissed as non-existent. 
Any descriptions of supernatural phenomena are thus 
disregarded or viewed with extreme suspicion, since 
“one can legitimately claim to know only propositions 
which describe sensory data and propositions which 
can be inferred from them” (Hammond et al., 1991, p. 
205). For the anthropologist of religion, this can 
become problematic because, in describing the direct 
experiences of a diviner, for example, it may involve 
engaging with, or describing, phenomena that may 
not be immediately perceptible to the investigator, but 
that may be to the diviner. The point is that, in 
societies not bounded by the limitations and 
boundaries of scientific objectivism and rationalism, 
no boundaries may exist between the ‘real’ world, as 
experienced through the senses, and the supernatural 
world. As a result, for such societies, there is a 
constant interaction between the real world and the 
supernatural world. By relying exclusively on an 
objectivist and rationalist framework, the said 
anthropologist may ethnocentrically dismiss a 
society’s sensitivity to this interaction as a mark of 
irrationality, thereby limiting him- or herself to a 
biased view of the society.    
 
Anthropology, however, occupies an ambiguous 
position that makes it part of both the humanities and 
the natural and social sciences. Anthropologists have 
often had to deal with phenomena for which classical 
scientific methods were wholly inappropriate. The 
reason for this is that, due to the holistic nature of 
anthropology, in trying to understand the totality of 
social life, some aspects of human behaviour can be 
studied empirically, scientifically and rationally, 
while other aspects require more of an interpretation, 
or a search for meaning. This point is particularly 
relevant for the social sciences such as anthropology, 
because, as Schutz points out, “the observational field 
of the social scientist - social reality - has a specific 
meaning and relevance structure for the human beings 
living, acting and thinking within it” (quoted in 
Babbie & Mouton, 2001, p. 29). The social scientist 
should thus be involved in the description of the 
direct experiences of people in the “lived world” 
(Hammond et al., 1991, p. 133). As a result, Keesing 
and Strathern (1998) suggest that anthropology 
operates within two different modes which place the 
discipline within the realm of both the humanities and 
sciences:  
 
Much … anthropology, guided by a 
search for meaning, has been squarely 
interpretive, hence in many ways closer 
to the humanities than to the natural 
sciences. Anthropology, like history, has 
modes in which it explores and interprets 
phenomena … and modes in which it 
seeks to generalize and theorize in ways 
that place it squarely in the social 
sciences.  (p. 7) 
 
The earlier pioneers of anthropology failed to 
recognise this and therefore attempted to apply a rigid 
idea of rationalism to the study of human phenomena.   
 
Anthropology ran into significant problems as a result 
of these attempts.  According to Coleman et al. (1980, 
p. 75), anthropology, along with sociology, emerged 
as an apparently independent scientific discipline by 
the beginning of the twentieth century, and was 
making rapid advancements regarding attempts to 
understand the role of socio-cultural factors in human 
development and behaviour. However, certain 
problems emerged in anthropological research that 
threatened the discipline’s efforts to pursue a strict 
scientific methodology: 
 
the investigator who attempts to conduct 
cross-cultural research is plagued by 
numerous … methodological problems, 
such as (a) different language and thought 
systems; (b) political and cultural climates 
that prevent objective inquiry; (c) 
difficulties in finding appropriately trained 
local scientists to collaborate in the 
research and to prevent the ethnocentric 
attitudes … of ‘outsiders’ from distorting 
the findings. … Moreover, Western trained 
anthropologists made observations of the 
behaviour of ‘natives’ and considered 
those behaviours in the context of Western 
scientific thought.  (Coleman et al., 1980, 
p. 76) 
 
This statement suggests the apparent contradiction 
between the anthropological pursuit of cultural 
relativism and the goals of Western science, in that, if 
the goal of anthropology is to understand a perception 
of the world from the point of view of the “native”, 
then it is imperative to relinquish Western ideas of 
rationalism, since the anthropologist cannot assume 
that Western ideas of rationalism are universal. As 
Jarvie and Agassi (1970) point out, the pursuit of 
rational explanation encouraged a biased view, even 
within anthropology, of what could be classified as 
irrational: 
 
From Tylor and Frazer, to Evans-Pritchard 
and Beattie, anthropologists have tried to 
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explain why someone desiring crops 
follows up the planting of seeds with the 
enactment of a magical rite. … One 
explanation … held that magic … was as 
rational as planting. … Why, though, was 
magic problematic and not planting? Why 
was it taken for granted that planting is 
rational? Probably because it is relatively 
easy to explain …. (quoted in Wilson, 
1970, p. 172) 
 
The science of planting was regarded as 
unproblematic because the rationalism behind it could 
be understood by Western anthropologists and could 
therefore be explained. However, the accompanying 
magical rites presented a problem because they did 
not conform to Western standards of rationalism and 
could therefore not be easily explained rationally. 
 
One of the ways in which the earlier anthropologists 
tried to overcome this problem was simply to impose 
Western rationalism upon seemingly irrational 
practices in non-Western societies, especially with 
regard to practices of magic, which involved the 
human attempt to control supernatural forces for 
various purposes. In their analysis of Frazer’s 
attempts to explain magical beliefs as a cosmology or 
world view, Jarvie and Agassi (1970) argue that 
“Frazer’s theory that magic is a cosmology … 
explains how magic can be made more palatable to a 
Westerner: regarded as a cosmology, magic becomes 
logically somewhat similar to the world view of 
science” (quoted in Wilson, 1970, p. 174). In 
seemingly attempting thus to make magical beliefs 
and practices more acceptable by making the 
explanation of magic more rational, Frazer tried to 
show that there are inherent similarities between 
beliefs in magic and beliefs in science. Jarvie and 
Agassi (1970) state that “on Frazer’s view, belief in 
magic is nearer to belief in science than to belief in 
religion. … Religion gives the universe free will; 
magic (like science) views it as a predictable and 
manipulable system” (quoted in Wilson, 1970, p. 
175).  
 
Thus, if the anthropologist is confined to a heavily 
rational explanation of a socio-cultural phenomenon, 
s/he risks a very limited view of what is being 
studied, a limitation which is recognised by Scupin 
and Decorse (2001) specifically with regard to the 
anthropology of religion: 
 
In studying the anthropology of religion, a 
critical point must be understood: 
Anthropologists are not concerned with the 
‘truth’ or ‘falsity’ of … religious belief. 
Being based on the scientific method, 
anthropology is not competent or able to 
investigate supernatural … questions that 
go beyond empirical data.  (p. 329) 
 
In terms of Scupin and Decorse’s argument, one 
critical question that could be asked is: if a 
phenomenon cannot be proven by rational or 
empirical means, does it mean that the phenomenon 
does not exist, and, therefore, that there is nothing to 
investigate? The beliefs that people in different 
cultures in different places have had in something 
greater than themselves is at the heart of the 
anthropological interest in religion. In fact, one could 
even go as far as to ask: how have beliefs in the 
supernatural been able to survive for as long as they 
have in various societies if there is not some element 
of validity or justification for such beliefs? After all, 
through enculturation, people inherit certain beliefs 
and are conditioned to view their world in a particular 
way. Thus, Schutz states that, through the use of “a 
series of common-sense constructs … [people] have 
pre-selected and pre-interpreted [their] world which 
they experience as the reality of their daily lives” 
(quoted in Babbie & Mouton, 2001, p. 29). The issue 
that is at stake here is the question of whether or not 
there is an alternative means of explanation to that of 
the dominant Western model of scientific rationalism. 
I would argue that indeed there is, but that this 
alternative is a complete contradiction of everything 
that Western science stands for. The alternative is to 
assume that the supernatural world exists without 
being bound by the limitations of a Western-defined 
rationalism. 
 
Relativism and Rationalism 
 
One major problem with scientific rationalism is its 
alleged incompatibility with religion, and hence the 
supernatural. As indicated by Scupin and Decorse 
(2001, p. 329), anthropology is limited by a rational 
scientific approach to the study of religion that makes 
it a difficult subject to deal with. The anthropological 
concern of trying to understand the religious and 
supernatural beliefs of a people is made difficult by 
the tension that exists between an objective, 
empirical, rational approach to a subjective, faith-
based subject. The complication arises from the fact 
that social scientists have tried to separate science and 
religion, treating them as mutually incompatible and 
irreconcilable. According to Pauw (1975), science 
and religion cannot be separated, because they form 
part of a three-part orientation within which human 
societies exist. These orientations are: the magical, 
the religious and the secular. Science represents a 
component that exists between the religious and 
secular orientations, as the antithesis to the magical 
orientation. In this sense, science should not be 
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defined “in the narrow sense of natural science, 
experimental science or empirical research, but in the 
broad sense of Wissenschaft - the … striving to 
increase and systematize knowledge” (Pauw, 1975, 
pp. 12-13). In so far as science is thus concerned with 
systematising knowledge in a rational way, studies of 
religion can also be regarded as sciences because they 
are also involved in the systematising of knowledge. 
However, the difference with studies of religion is 
that they aim to systematise knowledge that is 
accepted in faith, and not necessarily based on 
empirical testing: “Systematic theology, for example 
… is concerned with systematizing in a rational 
manner the body of knowledge accepted in faith, and 
relating it to knowledge deriving from other sources” 
(Pauw, 1975, p. 13). This suggests that rationality, as 
exemplified by science, can have a place in a 
religious orientation. It can also exist within the 
secularist orientation, in which case it is called 
“‘rationalism’ as it is commonly understood” (Pauw, 
1975, p. 13). The magical orientation, as opposed to 
the religious and secularist, is thus characterised by a 
lack of special concern with rational systematisation. 
The point made here is that science and religion 
cannot be separated, in that they exist in a 
complementary relationship.  As Pauw (1975) argues,  
 
I do not hold a religious orientation to be 
irreconcilable with natural science. … A 
combination of the two may involve 
tension, but it is a tension that is accepted 
… on the assumption that there is an 
ultimate unity which cannot be fathomed 
with our incomplete knowledge and 
understanding of reality, part of which 
lies outside the field of sensory 
experience.  (p. 16) 
 
While it can be argued that it is possible for a rational, 
scientific systematisation of knowledge to exist 
within or alongside a religious and/or supernatural 
orientation, this combination can be problematic, 
especially from an anthropological viewpoint. By 
rationally systematising knowledge of the religious 
and supernatural beliefs of peoples in other societies, 
anthropologists may thereby create categories of 
systematisation that may seem rational and relevant 
within the context of anthropology as a Western 
science, but that may be irrelevant to the societies 
under study. The distinction between the natural and 
supernatural as two separate categories within 
anthropological studies of religion is a case in point. 
While it may make sense to create these categories 
from a scientific viewpoint, the distinction may not 
exist in the society under study. For example, 
according to Harris (1993), 
 
few preindustrial cultures make a neat 
distinction between natural and 
supernatural phenomena. In a culture 
where people believe ghosts are always 
present, it is not necessarily either natural 
or supernatural to provide dead ancestors 
with food and drink.  (p. 386) 
 
To further illustrate this point, Newman (1965) refers 
to the problem of applying the categories of natural 
and supernatural to the Gururumba of western New 
Guinea: “It should be mentioned … that our use of 
the notion ‘supernatural’ does not correspond to any 
Gururumba concept: they do not divide the world into 
natural and supernatural parts” (p. 83). This problem 
relates to the issue at stake in Merleau-Ponty’s 
critique of the determinacy or boundary-fixing 
inherent in objectivist and rationalist interpretations. 
The creation of categories such as natural and 
supernatural is a means of creating boundaries 
between two different worlds that, in the daily 
experiences of a specific society, may not exist. This 
illustrates the problem of applying the Western idea 
of a rational systematisation of knowledge within a 
non-Western context. People are engaged in an active 
process of making sense of their worlds or realities. 
Indeed, “people are continuously constructing, 
developing and changing the everyday interpretations 
of their world(s)” (Babbie & Mouton, 2001, p. 28). 
Attempting to apply rigid scientific models to explain 
how people view their worlds is thus problematic. 
 
The branding of a society as irrational because it 
believes in the existence of supernatural forces is 
something that could be challenged anthropologically, 
mainly because of anthropology’s dual nature in 
being aligned with both the sciences and the 
humanities. As mentioned earlier, anthropology is in a 
unique position to challenge the alleged irrationality 
of non-Western societies because it not only focuses 
on the Western scientific idea of rationalism, but also 
recognises, from a humanities viewpoint, that other 
societies may interpret rationalism differently. 
Conceptions of rationalism are cross-culturally 
variable, therefore it cannot be assumed that the 
Western concept of rationalism is the only one that 
counts. Other cultures may have their own 
perceptions of rationalism that may contradict our 
own. For example, one of the key features of Western 
scientific rationalism is the aim of coherence in the 
systematisation of knowledge. However, how 
coherence is experienced and interpreted in different 
societies differs from the Western interpretation: 
 
By associating primitive magical thought 
with a lack of concern with comprehensive 
rationality, I am … not saying that 
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primitive peoples do not value coherence, 
but that in their cultures, coherence is 
experienced in other ways than by 
conscious intellectual efforts to extend and 
systematize knowledge. … I am not 
maintaining … that primitive peoples lack 
the ability to think rationally. The criterion 
of distinction is the extent to which 
comprehensive rational systematization is 
valued.  (Pauw, 1975, p. 15) 
 
Because such societies may differ from the Western 
in terms of what it means to be rational, this does not 
make them irrational. Within the contexts of those 
societies, it may be regarded as irrational not to 
believe in the supernatural, just as much as it may be 
regarded, in Western society, to be irrational to 
believe in the supernatural. There is a hidden 
rationality even within the context of the supernatural. 
According to O’Grady (1989), 
 
in the late Middle Ages … existence of 
witches and warlocks was [regarded as] … 
an established fact. If possession of 
devilish magical powers were accepted … 
as a proven reality, then achievement of 
these powers was obviously possible.  (p. 
87) 
 
It appears, therefore, that people’s belief in 
supernatural powers could be based on what they 
have perceived as a rational inference of such powers. 
Ironically, there seems to be a suggestion here that a 
relationship exists between subjective belief and 
objective rationality. Since most of the societies of the 
Middle Ages believed in the existence of supernatural 
forces, it was regarded as totally rational to assume 
that people could possess supernatural powers.   
 
The problem with the Western conception of 
rationalism is that it has been made to occupy a 
central position in the progress of Western 
‘civilisation’ itself. Thus, reason has itself become 
one of the characteristics necessary for progress. This 
idea was alluded to earlier in the reference to what 
happened to supernatural beliefs during the 
Enlightenment. It would seem, therefore, that 
societies viewed as irrational, from a Western 
perspective, need to be developed by acquiring 
rationalism in order to progress. From the Western 
viewpoint, progress can only be achieved with the 
choice to accept rationalism, which implies an end to 
beliefs in the supernatural and an acceptance of 
science as the only true form of knowledge. In terms 
of this, one can understand the popularity of the 
evolutionary models of human development, where 
science was used as a means to ‘prove’ that societies 
that believed in the supernatural were irrational, and, 
therefore, were inferior to the rational West. This 
view of non-Western cultures was criticised by 
anthropologists as being ethnocentric. This was why 
later theories were developed in order to try to 
provide alternative explanations for differences 
between human societies. Furthermore, while 
Western society does attach a great degree of 
significance to rationalism, it is not totally rational. 
As Pauw (1975) argues,  
 
even in Western large-scale society 
thought is comprehensively rational and 
systematic only to a limited extent. This 
kind of thought predominates only in 
certain fields of activity in which only 
certain persons actively participate. (p. 
15) 
 
However, it appears that the negative view of non-
Western cultures, classified as irrational, is still 
prevalent, for example in studies of abnormal 
psychology: 
 
The great advances that have come about 
in the understanding … of abnormal 
behaviour become all the more 
remarkable when viewed against the … 
background of ignorance, superstition 
and fear. Yet, … we are not free of all 
culturally conditioned constraints that 
inhibit truly rational approaches to many 
of our remaining problems. (Coleman et 
al., 1980, p. 25) 
 
The suggestion here is that culture is an impediment 
to rational thinking and therefore also prevents 
progress. How, then, can anthropology be taken 
seriously as a valid science if it attempts to 
understand how other cultures, viewed by the 
Western scientific enterprise as irrational, see the 
world around them? The implication is that the 
anthropologist, perhaps more so than any other social 
scientist, is in a position to understand why a 
particular culture may prefer a supernatural 
explanation of the world around it. However, if the 
anthropologist insists on a wholly rational approach to 
this problem, s/he compromises the holistic character 
of the discipline and limits him- or herself to 
alternative explanations other than the narrow-minded 
interpretations of rational observations.  
 
 
The Problem of Observation 
 
Another issue that makes the Western conception of 
scientific rationalism problematic for anthropology is 
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the question of the role of observation in determining 
rational explanations. Within the scientific world, it 
has been accepted without question that science is 
based on rational explanations of phenomena, 
explanations which are derived from objective, 
sensorial observations: 
 
It is the basic thesis of empiricism that 
knowledge derives from the senses, and 
that knowledge claims are justified by 
being ‘traced back’ to sensory input. 
(Hammond et al., 1991, p. 205) 
 
These objective observations rely on the processes of 
induction and deduction, which are assumed to lend 
credibility or reliability to the scientific knowledge 
that is generated from such processes. As Chalmers 
(1978) has stated, a common-sense or popular view of 
scientific knowledge is that it “is reliable knowledge 
because it is objectively proven knowledge” (p. 1). 
Thus, it appears that valid scientific knowledge is that 
which can be gained via objective inductive 
observation. That which is observed, as well as the 
observer, have an influence on ideas of what 
constitutes rational explanations of what is observed. 
In the West, what is regarded as rational inductive 
observation is presupposed to be obvious. However, 
Chalmers (1978) criticises this view: 
 
to regard the principle of induction … as 
‘obvious’ is not acceptable. What we 
regard as obvious is much too dependent 
on and relative to our education, our 
prejudices and our culture to be a reliable 
guide to what is reasonable.  (p. 20) 
 
The implication is that there is always a “pre-
theoretical understanding of what is going on” 
(Babbie & Mouton, 2001, p. 28). Thus, Chalmers 
argues that “What an observer sees … depends in part 
on his past experience, his knowledge and his 
expectations” (1978, p. 25). Chalmers’s argument is 
supported by the views of O’Grady (1989): 
 
William James, who originally expounded 
the philosophy of pragmatism, … writes: 
“…I find it hard to believe that principles 
can exist which make no difference to 
facts.” In Quantum Physics, the existence 
of the observer alters and therefore 
influences that which is observed. So, in 
William James’s view, beliefs in a 
transcendental world must alter the 
experience of facts in this one.  (p. 148) 
 
Thus, it appears that there are different interpretations 
of what is observed. As an illustration of this point, 
one can look at the example given by Coleman et al. 
(1980): 
 
Dance manias, taking the form of 
epidemics of raving, jumping … and 
convulsions, were reported as early as the 
tenth century. … The behaviour was very 
similar to the ancient orgiastic rites by 
which people had worshipped the Greek 
gods. … These … were deeply embedded 
in the culture and … kept alive by secret 
gatherings.  Probably considerable guilt 
and conflict were engendered.  (p. 31) 
 
This example illustrates an attempt to interpret ritual 
behaviour, seemingly associated with supernatural 
beliefs, in terms of scientific rationalism. However, 
this interpretation lacks certainty and conviction as 
the only explanation for this phenomenon. It is 
possible to assume that the people from the culture 
within which these rituals were practised could have 
interpreted this same phenomenon as a supernatural 
occurrence. Thus, there are two quite different 
interpretations of the same occurrence.  How does one 
decide which interpretation is the more valid?  One 
cannot decide, because both interpretations may be 
influenced by the cultural contexts of the interpreters, 
thus making both interpretations equally valid. The 
supernatural interpretation of the event thus cannot be 
dismissed as irrational. 
 
The Problem of the Paradigm 
 
The limitations of science and rationalism also 
become apparent if one looks at the ideas of Thomas 
Kuhn, as set out in Chalmers (1978), about the 
paradigm. In Kuhn’s view, the paradigm is central to 
the existence of science because it forms the basis of 
scientific thought: “The existence of a paradigm 
capable of supporting a normal science tradition is the 
characteristic that distinguishes science from non-
science, according to Kuhn” (Chalmers, 1978, p. 91). 
Furthermore, within the context of Kuhn’s theory of 
scientific revolution, for science to progress, 
paradigms must encounter problems in order to 
facilitate the revolution in science: “Kuhn recognises 
that paradigms will always encounter difficulties. 
There will always be anomalies” (Chalmers, 1978, p. 
94). As a result of these anomalies, different 
paradigms exist within science as different ways of 
trying to address the anomalies. This could, in turn, 
result in scientists switching between incompatible 
paradigms - an activity that, ironically, Kuhn views as 
similar to a religious conversion: 
 
The change of allegiance on the part of 
individual scientists from one paradigm 
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to an incompatible alternative is likened 
by Kuhn to a ‘gestalt switch’ or a 
‘religious conversion’. There will be no 
purely logical argument that is able to 
demonstrate the superiority of one 
paradigm over another and that thereby 
compels a rational scientist to make the 
change.  (Chalmers, 1978, p. 96) 
 
The objectivist-rationalist paradigm is inherently 
inappropriate as a means of uncovering meaning in 
the lived world of human beings. Many theoretical 
frameworks that have been created within this 
paradigm have attempted to explain, rather than 
describe, human phenomena in terms of causal 
relationships that are externally related. Causal 
relationships and explanations are a characteristic 
feature of the natural science paradigm and are most 
explicit in “the relationships involved in the laws that 
are postulated by the empirical sciences” (Hammond 
et al., 1991, p. 137). These scientific laws are based 
on the idea that a functional relationship between 
variables can be determined if these variables can be 
measured or assessed independently. Merleau-Ponty 
denied the usefulness of this claim, especially if it is 
applied to the lived world of human beings. For him, 
“causal explanations can[not] be given for human 
action ... What are instead involved are internal 
relations of meaning” (Hammond et al., p. 139). 
Causal relationships between variables can only be 
determined by the fixed boundaries of one variable in 
relation to another. Thus, causal determination can 
only occur between objects that are themselves 
determinate. Since the lived world of humans, which 
can include the supernatural world, is non-
determinate, it cannot be subjected to mere external, 
causal relationships. It is the internal relationships 
that give meaning to the lived world of humans. This 
idea is supported by the internal meanings generated 
through contact with the supernatural in the religious 
ideas of most human societies. 
 
Thus, it could be argued that science itself is but one 
paradigm that cannot successfully address all of the 
anomalies that make up the world around us. This 
implies that science, along with rationalism, is 
inadequate in terms of investigating phenomena that 
fall outside of what science is capable of addressing. 
Supernatural interpretations of anomalies constitute a 
second paradigm, most likely viewed as incompatible 
with that of science, but that could exist alongside the 
paradigm of science. However, rationalism prevents 
the recognition of the supernatural paradigm as a 
valid paradigm in its own right. The point is clear, 
namely that science is limited. In the words of 
Watson (1973), 
 
Science no longer holds any absolute 
truths. Even the discipline of physics, 
whose laws once went unchallenged, has 
had to submit to the indignity of an 
Uncertainty Principle … we have begun to 
doubt even fundamental propositions, and 
the old distinction between natural and 
supernatural has become meaningless.  (p. 
xi) 
 
Supernatural beliefs are not irrational but provide 
alternative explanations for phenomena that science 
cannot explain. Jarvie and Agassi (1970) support this 
argument: 
 
... in Frazer’s sense, magic is perfectly 
compatible with rationally explicable 
behaviour - it is a [total] world-view, a 
cosmology … it is a substitute for 
systematic and analytic thinking, it does 
answer all those difficult questions some of 
which Western science answers, some of 
which … Western science offers no 
explanation [for]. (quoted in Wilson, 1970, 
p. 192) 
 





It has been my purpose in this paper not to discredit 
or dismiss the benefits of Western science and 
rationalism, but to point out, with reference to a 
number of ideas in phenomenology and their 
applicability to anthropology, some of the problems 
that scientific rationalism can have for anthropology, 
and for other social and human sciences for that 
matter. While it can be convincingly argued that 
rationalism should be an inherent part of any science, 
natural or social, it cannot be disputed that the 
greatest strength of rationalism can also be its greatest 
weakness. Rationalism within anthropology is 
limiting, for the various reasons outlined in this paper. 
Within this context, it may be useful to consider the 
two methodological postulates proposed by Schutz, 
namely: the postulate of logical consistency and the 
postulate of adequacy (Babbie & Mouton, 2001, p. 
29). In my view, it is especially the second postulate 
that is of importance, incorporating as it does the idea 
that interpretations of the social world should be 
comprehensible to the actors themselves. What is 
implied, is that the people we study should be able to 
“recognize themselves in our theories of them” 
(Babbie & Mouton, 2001, p. 29). It must also be 
accepted that science, as we know it, does not have all 
the answers to the mysteries that exist in our world. 
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Yes, we as scientists should approach claims of 
supernatural or paranormal phenomena with caution, 
but we should also be willing to have open minds. 
Indeed, if we ever reach the point where we feel that 
there is nothing more to discover, no new knowledge 
to gain, then where will that leave us as pioneers of 
knowledge? The supernatural world holds numerous 
possibilities as an undiscovered frontier; it is a world 
that waits only for those brave enough to make the 
leap from the limitations of rationalism to the 
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